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(48 C.2d 577; 311 P.2d 494] 
[L.A. No. 24292. In Bank. May 24, 1957.] 
HOSS HARDY, Appellant, v. ;JAMES IJESI1£E VIAI1 et al., 
Hespondents. 
[la, lb] Malicious Prosecution-Nature of Original Proceedin.gs.-
Generally, a malicious prosecution action may be founded on 
a proceeding before an administrative body; one who initiates 
or procures the initiation of civil proceedings against another 
before an administrative board which has power to take action 
adversely affecting the legally protected interests of the other 
is subject to liability for any special harm caused thereby, if 
the proceedings are initiated without probable cause to believe 
that the charge or claim on which the proceedings are based 
is well founded, and primarily for a purpose other than that of 
securing appropriate action by the board, and if the proceed-
ings have terminated in favor of the person against whom 
they are brought. 
[2] !d.-Nature of Original Proceedings.-It makes little difference 
to a person whether his rights are violated by the institution 
of proceedings before a court or an administrative body, and 
his right of redress for malicious conduct should not depend 
on the form of the proceeding by which the injury is inflicted. 
[Sa, 3b] !d.-Nature of Original Proceedings.-The rule that an 
action for malicious prosecution may be founded on the in-
stitution of a proceeding before an administrative agency is 
not dependent on the type of judicial review which is allowed 
after decision of the administrative agency involved; in con-
sidering the availability of an action for malicious prosecution, 
no distinction should be made between proceedings commenced 
before agencies having adjudicatory powers and those com-
menced before agencies whose findings of fact are subject to 
trial de novo in a judicial proceeding. (Disapproving Vargas 
v. Giacosa, 121 Cal.App.2d 521 [263 P.2d 840]; Lorber v. 
Stor1·ow, 22 Cal.App.2d 25 [70 P.2d 513); Hayashida v. Kaki-
moto, 132 Cal.App. 743 [23 P.2d 311]; and Gosulich v. Stempel, 
81 Cal.App. 278 [253 P. 344].) 
[ 4] Civil Service-Boards and Commissions-Judicial Review.-
[1] Malicious prosecution predicated on prosecution, institution 
or instigation of administrative proceeding, note, 143 A.L.R. 157. 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Malicious Prosecution, § 10; Am.Jur., Malicious 
Prosecution, § 7 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Malicious Prosecution, § 6; [ 4) Civil 
Service, § 13; [5, 6] Public Officers, § 61; [7, 8] Universities and 
Colleges, § 7; [9] Malicious Prosecution, § 4; [10] Malicious Prose-
cution, § 32. 
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The State Personnel Board has adjudicatory powers, and its 
findings of fact will not be disturbed if supported by sub-
stantial evidence. 
[5] Public Officers-Civil Liability-Immunity.-The rule of abso-
lute immunity of public officers from civil liability for ma-
licious prosecution, notwithstanding malice or other sinister 
motive, is not restricted to public officers who institute or 
take part in criminal actions, but extends to all executive 
public officers when performing within the scope of their power 
acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. 
[6] !d.-Civil Liability-Immunity.-What is meant by saying 
that an officer must be acting within his power to be entitled 
to immunity from liability for malicious prosecution cannot 
be more than that the occasion must be such as would have 
justified the act, if he had been using his power for any of the 
purposes on whose account it was vested in him. 
[7] Universities and College&-Liability of Offi.cer&-Immunity,-
The alleged purpose of certain school officers of a state college 
in conspiring with and aiding nonschool persons in making affi-
davits leading to the dismissal of a professor from his employ-
ment comes within the scope of the official duties of the school 
officers and within the rule of immunity from liability; the 
policy on which such rule is based would be defeated if it were 
held that whenever an officer uses his office for a personal 
motive not connected with the public good he acts outside his 
power. 
[8] !d.-Liability of Officers-Immunity.-The fact that certain 
school officers of a state college sought to procure the dis-
missal of a professor by acting in concert with other persons 
cannot properly be treated as destroying the immunity from 
liability which they would have if each of them had acted 
individually and independently of any other person to secure 
the same result; the underlying theory of absolute immunity is 
equally applicable whether the employee acts by himself or 
with others who are not immune. 
[9] Malicious Prosecution-By and Against Whom Action Main-
tainable.-In an action against certain school officers of a 
state college and other persons for maliciously and without 
probable cause having conspired to accuse a professor falsely 
of gross immorality and unprofessional conduct which resulted 
in his dismissal from his college position, a judgment in favor 
of the school defendants on sustaining their demurrer should 
be affirmed since they come within the protection of the rule of 
immunity from civil liability, but the alleged facts do not 
entitle a nonschool defendant to immunity from liability, and 
[ 5] See Cal.Jur., Public Officers, § 88; Am.Jur., Public Officers, 
§§ 289.5, 303 et seq. 
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a judgment in his favor on sustaining his demurrer, should be 
reversed. 
[10] Id.-Pleading.-Iu an action against certain school officers of 
a state college and against other persons for maliciously and 
without probable cause having conspired to accuse a pro-
fessor falsely of gross immorality and unprofessional con-
duet which resulted in his dismissal from his college position, 
though it was not specifically alleged that one nonschool dt>-
fendant knew or reasonably should have known that the affi-
davits making such charges were false, where it was alleged 
that he acted without probable cause in conspiring to make 
false charges against the professor and that the making of 
such charges was in pursuance of the conspiracy, this satisfied 
the usual rule that a general averment of want of probable 
cause is sufficient and that it is unnecessary to add a statt>-
ment of facts which tend to prove the averment, such as 
knowledge of falsity. 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of lJos 
Angeles County. Beach Vasey, Judge. Affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
Action for malicious prosecution. Judgment for defendant 
Vial reversed; judgment for other defendants affirmed. 
Desmond & Desmond and Walter Desmond for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Lee B. Stanton, 
Depnty Attorney General, and George H. Chula, for Re-
spondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.--Plaintiff was discharged from his employ-
ment as a professor at Long Beach State College as the result 
of charges made by defendants, and, after reinstatement to 
his position by the State Personnel Board, he commenced this 
action for damages for malicious prosecution. He named as 
defendants seven persons, hereafter referred to as the school 
defendants, \vho are officials of the college or of the state 
Department of Education, and three persons, Vial, Pond, and 
Egolf, who apparently have no connection with the college or 
the department.* General demurrers of Vial and the school 
*Defendant Peterson is president of the college, defendants Rhodes 
and Bryant are deans, and defendant J'ohnson is head of the division 
of the college in which plaintiff is employed. Defendant Roy E. Simp-
son is Director of Education of the State of California, defendant Vasche 
is assistant director of edueation of the Department of Education in 
charge of state colleges, and defendant Dresser is a special agent and 
field representative of the department. 
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defendants were sustained without leave to amend, and plain-
tiff has appealed from the ensuing judgments. 'l'he remaining 
two defendants are not involved on this appeal. 
The allegations of the complaint may be summarized as 
follows: Defendants wrongfully, maliciously and without 
probable cause conspired to accuse plaintiff falsely of gross 
immorality and unprofessional conduct during the period of 
his emplo:yment for the purpose of procuring his dismissal. 
In pursuance of the conspiracy, defendants Vial, Pond, and 
Egolf, aided and abetted by the other defendants, made and 
filed with the college affidavits which charged plaintiff falsely 
with the commission of acts of a base and depraved nature. 
By reason of the acts alleged in the affidavits plaintiff was 
dismissed from his employment at the college effective March 
27, 1953. After a hearing the State Personnel Board found 
that the charges were untrue and that the grounds for the 
dismissal were not sustained by the evidence. The board re-
voked the dismissal and ordered defendant Simpson to return 
plaintiff to his position at the college. No review of the 
board's decision was sought, and plaintiff was returned to his 
position. 
[la] It is the general rule that a malicious prosecution 
action may be founded upon a proceeding before an admin-
istrative body. Section 680 of the Restatement of 'l'orts de-
clares: ''One who initiates or procures the initiation of civil 
proceedings against another before an administrative board 
which has power to take action adversely affecting the legally 
protected interests of the other, is subject to liability for any 
special harm cau:;;ed thereby, if (a) the proceedings are 
initiated (i) without probable cause to believe that the charge 
or claim on which the proceedings are based is well founded, 
and (ii) primarily for a purpose other than that of securing 
appropriate action by the board, and (b) the proceedings have 
terminated in favor of the person against whom they are 
brought." (In accord, Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 425 
et seq. [76 App.D.O. 154, 143 A.L.R. 149] ; National Surety 
Co. v. Page, 58 F.2d 145, 148; Dixie Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Rivers, 209 Ga. 98 [70 S.E.2d 734, 740-741]; Rivers v. Dixie 
Broadcasting Corp., 88 Ga.App. 131 [76 S.E.2d 229, 233] ; 
Ranier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley F'arrns, 19 N.J. 552 [117 
A.2d 889, 895-896] ; see Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280 [113 
A.2d 671, 673-674, 52 A.L.R.2d 1208], cert. den. 350 U.S. 887 
[76 S.Ot. 141, 100 L.Ed. 782]; 143 A.L.R. 157.) 
The theory of these authorities is that the same harmful 
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consequences may result from the malicious institution of 
administrative proceedings as from judicial proceedings mali-
ciously begun, whether criminal or civil in nature. [2] As 
pointed out in the Melvin case, 130 F.2d 423, 426 [76 App. 
D.C. 154, 143 A.L.R. 149], it makes little difference to a 
person whether his rights are violated by the institution of 
proceedings before a court or before an administrative body, 
and his right to redress for malicious conduct should not de-
pend upon the form of the proceeding by which the injury is 
inflicted. The eourt further stated: "The administrative 
process is also a legal process, and its abuse in the same way 
with the same injury should receive the same penalty .... 
When private as well as public rights more and more are 
coming to be determined by administrative proceedings, it 
would be anomalous to have one rule for them and another 
for the courts in respect to redress for abuse of their powers 
and processes." (130 F.2d at pp. 426, 427.) 
[lb] We adopt the rule set forth in section 680 of the 
Restatement of Torts and hold that an action for malicious 
prosecution may be founded upon the institution of a proceed-
ing before an administrative agency. [3a] This rule is in 
no way dependent upon the type of judicial review which is 
allowed after decision of the administrative agency involved, 
and we do not agree with defendants' contention that plaintiff 
cannot maintain this action because the State Personnel Board 
assertedly cannot exercise adjudicatory powers and has no 
authority to make a final determination of a question of fact. 
In considering the availability of an action for malicious 
prosecution, no distinction should be made between proceed-
ings commenced before agencies having adjudicatory powers 
and those commenced before agencies whose findings of fact 
are subject to trial de novo in a judicial proceeding. Such a 
distinction is unsound in principle and if adopted would result 
in unnecessary complexity and confusion. [4] Moreover, it 
is settled that the State Personnel Board has adjudicatory 
powers, and its findings of fact will not be disturbed if sup-
ported by substantial evidence. (Shepherd v. State Personnel 
Board, ante, pp. 41,46-48 [307 P.2d 4].) 
[3b] The cases of Vargas v. Giacosa, 121 Cal.App.2d 521 
r263 P.2d 840], Lorber v. Sto17ow, 22 Cal.App.2d 25 [70 P.2d 
513], Hayashida v. Kakimoto, 132 Cal.App. 743 [23 P.2d 311], 
and Cosulich v. Stempel, 81 Cal.App. 278 [253 P. 344], which, 
without mentioning the authorities listed above or their 
reasoning, reached a contrary conclusion, are disapproved in-
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sofar as they are in conflict with the views expressed in this 
opinion. 
The seven school defendants contend that the judgment 
should be affirmed because, they assert, they are immune from 
civil liability. In White v. Towers, 37 Oal.2d 727 [235 P.2d 
209, 28 A.L.R.2d 636], we held that an investigator for the 
State Fish and Game Commission, who had the duty to investi-
gate crime and to institute criminal proceedings, was immune 
from civil liability for the malicious prosecution of a criminal 
action against the plaintiff. A similar conclusion was reached 
in Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Oal.2d 315 [239 P.2d 876], which 
involved deputy sheriffs and city policem,~n. [5] The rnle 
of absolute immunity, notwithstanding malice or other sinister 
motive, is not restricted to public officers who institute or 
take part in criminal actions. First recognized for the pro-
tection of judges (Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 335 [20 
L.Ed. 646]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to 
all executive public officers when performing within the scope 
of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or 
judgment. (Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [16 S.Ot. 631, 40 
L.Ed. 780] ; Standard Nut Mat·garine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 
557; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. B,-unswick, 69 
F.2d 383; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [73 App.D.C. 292]; 
FarT v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413; De ATnand v. Ainsworth, 
24 App.D.C. 167 [5 L.R.A.N.S. 163]; see Papagianalcis v. The 
Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262.) In this state Downer v. Lent, 
6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer Y. Arnold, 9H 
Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [222 P.2d 940], reeognize the same wide 
immunity. (Of. also W·ilson v. Sharp, 42 Cal.2d ()7;3, ti79 [268 
P.2d 1062].) 
The policy underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity is 
well stated by Judge Learned Hand in GregoiTe v. Biddle, 177 
F.2d 579, 581, as follows: "It does indeed go without saying 
that an official, who is in faet guilty of using his powers to 
vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive 
not connected with the public good, should not escape liability 
for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in 
practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be 
monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so 
is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well 
founded until the ease has been tried, and that to submit all 
officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of 
a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would 
dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most 
May 1957] HARDY v. VIAL 
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irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. 
Again and again the public interest calls for action which 
may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which 
an official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a 
jury of his good faith. There must indeed be means of punish-
ing public offlcers who have been truant to their duties; but 
that is quite another matter from exposing such as have 
been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from 
their errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found 
in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. 
In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave 
unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to sub-
ject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of 
retaliation.'' 
The seven school defendants occupied positions which would 
ordinarily embrace duties relating to the investigation of 
eharges whieh could lead to the discipline or dismissal of per-
sons such as plaintiff, and it is not claimed that the school 
defendants were without authority to investigate and prose-
eute eharges made against employees. Plaintiff contends, 
however, that the school defendants are not entitled to the 
protection of the immunity rule because they assertedly acted 
beyond the scope of their employment when they conspired 
with the nonschool defendants and aided them in making and 
filing affidavits containing false charges. [6] It should be 
noted in this connection that "\Vhat is meant by saying that 
the officer must be acting within his power [to be entitled to 
immunity] cannot be more than that the occasion must be 
such as would have justified the act, if he had been using his 
power for any of the purposes on whose account it was vested 
in him." ( Gregoi1·e v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d at p. 581.) [7] The 
alleged purpose of the conspiracy, and, accordingly, the pur-
pose of the school defendants in aiding the nonschool defend-
ants in making the affidavits, was to accomplish the dismissal 
of plaintiff from his employment. This purpose, of course, 
was clearly within the scope of the official duties of the school 
defendants and within the protection of the immunity rule. 
The policy on which the rule is based would be defeated if it 
were held that whenever an officer uses his office for a per-
sonal motive not eonnected with the public good he acts out-
side his power. 
[8] The fact that the school defendants sought to attain 
their objective by acting in concert with other persons cannot 
properly be treated as destroying the immunity which they 
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would have if each of them had acted individually and inde-
pendently of any other person to secure the same result. The 
underlying theory of absolute immunity is equally applicable 
whether the employee acts by himself or ·with others who are 
not immune. (Cf. White v. Brinkman, 23 Cal.App.2d 307, 
310 et seq. [73 P.2d 254] [public officers treated as acting in 
their official capacities even though they acted in concert with 
other persons]; Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406-407 [56 
A.L.R. 1239]; IIoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224 [28 N.W. 
2d 780, 790, 173 A.L.R. 819]; Linder v. Foster, 209 Minn. 43 
[295 N.W. 299, 301-302] .) [9] Since the seven sehool de-
fendants have immunity, the judgment in their favor must be 
affirmed. 
The complaint does not allege faets which would entitle Vial 
to immunity, and we are of the view that a cause of action is 
stated against him. [10] While it is not specifically alleged 
that Vial knew or reasonably should have known that the 
affidavits were false, it is alleged that he acted without prob-
able cause in conspiring to make false charges against plain-
tiff and that the making of such charges was in pursuance 
of the conspiracy. This meets the usual rule that a general 
averment of want of probable cause is sufficient and that it is 
unnecessary to add a statement of facts which tend to prove 
the averment, such as knowledge of falsity. (See P~llvennacher 
v. Los Angeles Coordinating Committee, 61 Cal.App.2d 704, 
707 [143 P.2d 974]; Eustace v. Dechter, 28 Cal.App.2d 706, 
710 [83 P.2d 523]; 2 Witkin, California Procedure (1954) 
1357; 54 C.J.S. 1043; 14 A.L.R.2d 264, 282.) 
The judgment in favor of Vial is reversed. The judgment 
in favor of the other respondents is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and Mc-
Comb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Dissenting and Concurring.-! dissent. 
I agree with that portion of the majority opinion which 
holds that an action for malicious prosecution may be founded 
upon the institution of a proceeding before an administrative 
agency, and that the judgment in favor of Vial, a nonschool 
defendant, should be reversed. 
I cannot agree with that portion of the opinion which holds 
that the seven school defendants are entitled to hide behind 
the outmoded cloak of immunity from civil liability. Further-
more this is an appeal from a judgment entered upon the 
sustaining of a demurrer to a complaint without leave to 
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amend. "['I'] he only issue involved in a demurrer hearing 
... lis] whether the eomplaillt, as it stands, unconnected with 
<•xtraueous matters, states a eause of action." (Griffith v. 
Department of Public Works, 141 Cal.App.2d 876, 381 [296 
P.2d 838] .) 'l'he rule is well established that the allegations 
of the complaint must be taken as true. The question is then 
one of law only and if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action 
on any theory he is entitled to a trial on the factual issues 
involved. 
Plaintiff's complaint charged that the 10 defendants, seven 
of whom were school officials,* had engaged in a conspiracy 
for the purpose of procuring his dismissal from his employ-
ment; that in aid of such conspiracy the school defendants 
aided and abetted the nonschool defendants in preparing 
affidavits falsely accusing plaintiff of certain vile and depraved 
acts. Plaintiff also alleged that because of these affidavits and 
the acts constituting the conspiracy, he was dismissed from 
his employment; that after a hearing it was unanimously 
found by the State Personnel Board that the charges against 
plaintiff were untnw. Plaintiff also sets forth in detail the 
damages suffered by him as a result of the charges made by 
the defendants. Plaintiff has set forth all the necessary ele-
ments of an action for malicious prosecution. 
The following statement from the majority opinion is clearly 
without basis in fact or in law: '' 'l'he alleged purpose of the 
conspiracy, and, accordingly, the pnrpose of the school defend-
ants in aiding the nonschool defendants in making the affi-
davits, was to accomplish the dismissal of plaintiff frorn his 
employment. This purpose, of eottrse, was clearly within the 
scope of the official duties of the school defendants and within 
the protection of the immunity rule." (Emphasis added.) 
It will be recalled that plaintiff charged that the conspiracy 
was malicious; that defendants agreed between themselves to 
falsely charge plaintiff with vile and depraved acts to procure 
his dismissal. The majority opinion informs us, however, that 
"The policy on which the rule [immunity from civil liability] 
is based would be defeated if it were held that whenever an 
officer uses his office for a personal motive not connected with 
the public good he acts outside his power." (Emphasis added.) 
It will also be recalled that three of the defendants were not 
school or department personnel. The majority, however, states 
that this does not remove the protective "immunity" from 
*'l'wo of the nonschool defendants are not involved on this appeal. 
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the school defendants. It is difficult for me to imagine how 
public officials acting with malice aforethought and swearing 
to falsehoods in conspiracy with outsiders can possibly be con-
sidered as acting within the "scope of their authority." 'rhe 
undeniable scope of the authority of school officials is to pro-
tect students from those found unfit to teach by reason of lack 
of ability or immoral character. The scope of authority of such 
school officials is most certainly not to procure the dismissal 
of teachers by entering into a conspiracy with outsiders to 
defame and assassinate a teacher's character without justifi-
cation or probable cause for believing the defamatory remarks 
to be true. The question of probable cause cannot be tried on 
a demurrer hearing inasmuch as for the purpose of determin-
ing the sustainability of the demurrer every single allegation 
of plaintiff's complaint must be taken as tnw. Aside from the 
doctrine of governmental immunity, which I will hereinafter 
discuss, plaintiff was entitled to a trial on the merits since 
governmental immunity does not apply when the official is 
acting outside the scope of his authority. A majority of this 
court held, in White v. Towers, 37 Oal.2d 727, 733 [235 P.2d 
209, 28 A.L.R.2d 636],* that "It is well established that a 
public officer is liable for injuries caused by acts done outside 
the scope of his authority." In cases of this character liability 
for damages cannot be made to rest on mere conspiracy. The 
gravamen of the action is the malicious prosectdion of the 
criminal charge without probable cause. (Dowdell v. Carpy, 
129 Cal. 168,171 [61 P. 948]; Andrews v. Young, 21 Cal.App. 
2d 523 [69 P.2d 891] .) If any public official, under the guise 
of investigation, may conspire with persons having no official 
standing to injure others by maliciously and falsely accusing 
them of base and vile conduct and in so doing escape all 
liability, it would appear to me that such a result would lead 
to more, rather than less, dishonesty on the part of public 
officials. In the other cases in which I have dissented (White 
v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727, 734 [235 P.2d 209, 28 A.L.R.2d 636] ; 
Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Oal.2d 315, 324 [239 P.2d 876] ; 
Talley v. Northern San Diego Cot~nty Hospital Dist., 41 Cal.2d 
33, 41 [257 P.2d 22] ; Turner v. Mellon, 41 Oal.2d 45, 49 [257 
P.2d 15] ; Peterson v. Robison, 43 Cal.2d 690, 698 [277 P.2d 
19] ; dissenting opinion on denial of hearing, Madison v. City 
&; County of San Francisco, 106 Oal.App.2d 232 [234 P.2d 
995, 236 P.2d 141]) a majority of this court had not reached 
the peak of injustice that it has reached in the case at bar. 
*(Which I believe was incorrectly decided.) 
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In my dissent in the Talley case (supra, p. 43) I pointed 
out that "'l'he government obviously cannot insure the citizen 
against all defects and errors in administration, but there is 
no reason why the most flagrant of the injuries wrongfully 
sustained by the citizen, those arising from the torts [in this 
instance a malicious one] of governmental officers and em-
ployees, should be allowed to rest at the door of the unforttt-
nate citizen alone. The entire doctrine of governmental im-
munity rests upon a rotten foundation, and professors, writers 
and liberal-minded judges are of the view that it should be 
placed in the judicial garbage can where it belongs. (See 
Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85 [136 P.2d 480] ; 75 
A.L.R. 1196; Brooklyn Law Review, April, 1932, 'Shmild the 
Liability of il'hmicipalities in 'I'ort be Extended to Include In-
jnry and Damage Caused in the Negligent Performance of a 
Governmental Function?'; 120 A.L.R. 1376; 54 Harv.L.Rev., 
pp. 437-462, 'Municipal 'I'ort Liability in Operation'.)" I 
also pointed out that I had thought when People v. Superior 
Court, 29 Cal.2d 754 [178 P.2d 1, 40 A.L.R.2d 919], was 
decided in 1947, that we had begun to revamp our ideas. It 
was there said that ''The considerations of an asserted sub-
version of public interests by embarrassments, difficulties and 
losses, which developed the doctrine of nonliability of the 
sovereign in former times, are no longer persuasive in rela-
tion to an industrial or business enterprise which by itself 
may be looked to for the dil';eharge of all appropriate demands 
and expenses growing out of operation." A majority of this 
eourt has gone to greater lengths here in sustaining the out-
moded doctrine than ever before. If the archaic doctrine of 
governmental immunity were annihilated once and for all 
by this court, situations such as we have here where, accord-
ing to the allegations of the complaint, dishonest public offi-
cials conspired with private persons would become nonexistent. 
The very thought that they might be found guilty of malicious 
prosecution would be a deterrent to conduct not based on 
probable eause. 
I would reverse the judgment in favor of all defendants. 
